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Abstract
We analyze a model of diusion on social networks. Agents are connected according
to an undirected graph (the network) and choose one of two actions (e.g., either to adopt
a new behavior or technology or not to adopt it). The return to each of the actions
depends on how many neighbors an agent has, which actions the agent's neighbors
choose, and some agent-specic cost and benet parameters. At the outset, a small
portion of the population is randomly selected to adopt the behavior. We analyze
whether the behavior spreads to a larger portion of the population. We show that
there is a threshold where \tipping" occurs: if a large enough initial group is selected
then the behavior grows and spreads to a signicant portion of the population, while
otherwise the behavior collapses so that no one in the population chooses to adopt
the behavior. We characterize the tipping threshold and the eventual portion that
adopts if the threshold is surpassed. We also show how the threshold and adoption
rate depend on the network structure. Applications of the techniques introduced in
this paper include marketing, epidemiology, technological transfers, and information
transmission, among others.
JEL classication: C45, C70, C73, D85, L15.
Keywords: Diusion, Social Networks, Tipping, Technology Adoption, Coordi-
nation.
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1 Introduction
An individual's decision to adopt a new behavior often depends on the distribution of similar
choices the individual observes among her peers, be they friends, colleagues, or acquaintances.
This may be driven by underlying network externalities, as in a decision to use a new
technology such as a new operating system or a new language, where the benets of the new
technology are larger when more of an agent's acquaintances have adopted the technology.
It may also be an artifact of simple learning processes, where the chance that an individual
learns about a new behavior or its benets is increasing in the number of neighbors who
have adopted the behavior. For instance, decisions regarding whether to go to a particular
movie or restaurant, or whether to buy a new product, provide examples of situations in
which information learned through friends and their behavior are important. Of course,
there are many other potential channels by which peer decisions may have signicant impact
on individual behavior. The starting point of our analysis is the observation that in all such
environments, the extent to which a new behavior spreads throughout a society depends not
only on its relative attractiveness or payo, but also on the underlying social structure.
In this paper, we analyze how social structure inuences the spread of a new behavior
or technology. We consider a binary choice model with two actions: A and B: We prescribe
action A to be the status quo. Agents adopt the new behavior B only if it appears worthwhile
for them to do so. This depends on the costs and benets of the action, and how many of
an agent's neighbors have adopted behavior B. The cost and benets of adopting the action
B dier randomly across agents.
The novelty of the model arises from the specication of the social interactions that each
agent experiences. Here we work with a stylized model of a social network. Each agent
has some number of neighbors. These are the people that (directly) inuence the agent's
decision. Dierent agents in the society may have dierent numbers of neighbors. This
number of neighbors is termed the agent's degree. The game is therefore described by two
distributions: one corresponding to the benets of the behavior B and one corresponding to
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number of neighbors that each agent has.
At the outset of the process, a fraction x
0
of agents is randomly assigned the action B
while all other players use the action A: For instance, this could metaphorically be thought
of as a free trial period of the new technology. At each period, each agent myopically best
responds to her neighbors' previous period's actions. The goal of the paper is to characterize
the evolving dynamics and its dependence on the underlying network structure.
There are three main insights that come out of our inquiry. First, we show the existence
of a smallest x
0
that is suÆcient for such dynamics to lead to an increase in the number
of B adopters over time. That is, we identify a tipping point beyond which the action B
becomes more prominent, i.e., diuses in the population. Second, for a class of cost-benet
distributions of the action B we can describe the shape of the diusion processes. The
uniform distribution serves as a good example. In that case, the speed of increase in the
number of B adopters increases up to a certain point in time at which the speed begins to
consistently decrease. Third, we show how the diusion of behavior changes as we change
the structure of social interaction. That is, we perform comparative statics pertaining to
the tipping point as well as the ultimate convergence point of the diusion dynamics, with
respect to the network structure. We examine two sorts of changes to the structure of social
interaction, one where agents are given more neighbors (in the sense of rst order stochastic
dominance of the degree distribution) and a second where the heterogeneity of degrees, or
connectedness, in the population increases (in the sense of second order stochastic dominance
of the degree distribution).
Our results can be taken as a metaphor for many applied problems. In marketing,
the results provide a step toward understanding when the adoption of a new technology or
product by only few consumers leads to a fad, as a function of the underlying social structure
(for several popular examples, see Gladwell (2000)). In criminology, the results advance the
theoretical foundations for understanding how crime spreads or vanishes (Glaeser, Sacerdote
and Scheinkman (1996) show the importance of social structures for criminal behavior). In
nancial markets, the results may be useful in understanding the evolution of \partial" bank
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runs and other sorts of herd behavior.
There have been several modeling endeavors pertaining to diusion processes related to
the one developed here. The rst prominent strand of literature that relates to our analysis
comes from the eld of epidemiology (e.g., see Bailey (1975)). The type of question that arises
in that literature regards the spread of disease among individuals connected by a network,
with some recent attention to power-law (aka scale-free) degree distributions (e.g., Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani (2000, 2001), May and Lloyd (2001), and Dezso and Barbasi (2002)),
but also some analysis pertaining to other classes of degree distributions (e.g., Lopez-Pintado
(2004), Jackson and Rogers (2004)). The second, and related, strand of research comes from
the computer science literature regarding the spread of computer viruses (see, for instance,
the empirical observations in Newman, Forrest, and Balthrop (2002)).
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The model from these
two strands closest to ours is the so called Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) model. In
that model, susceptible agents can catch a disease from infected neighbors and, once infected,
eventually either recover or are removed from the system and no longer infect others. There
are several studies examining the spread of such diseases as it relates to network structure
(e.g., Newman (2002)). These dier from our model, approach, and results in three notable
ways. First, in our model agents make strategic choices about behavior in contrast to being
randomly assigned an attribute (such as being infected). These choices depend on relative
costs and benets to behavior as well as on the proportion of neighbors choosing dierent
behaviors. This diers in structure from independent infection probabilities across links that
is assumed in the epidemiology literature (although it permits it as a special case). It also
leads to stark dierences in propagation dynamics. Indeed, in the epidemiology literature it
is enough to have a single infected neighbor for one to catch a disease, whereas our setup
allows for a change in behavior to depend on the fraction of neighbors (for example, making
adoption of a new behavior optimal if and only if the percentage of neighbors who have
already done so surpasses a certain threshold). Second, the tipping point that we identify
1
There is also a rich literature of case studies of the diusion of various sorts of information and behavior,
such as the classic study by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) on the adoption of tetracycline.
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relates to the percentage of the population that needs to be seeded as initial adopters in
order to have the new behavior persist. This diers from the thresholds usually investigated
in the epidemiology literature, where it is the probability of transmission that must pass
a threshold. This dierence is a natural consequence of the type of questions explored
in the epidemiology literature. Indeed, in the context of epidemics, a single individual is
often the rst source of a disease and can generate an epidemic depending on (exogenous)
infection probabilities.
2
In contrast, with behavior there can be some nontrivial portion
of the population that are initial adopters (independent of neighbors' behavior), such as
those who gain utility from experimenting with new behaviors or products, or those exposed
to a trial run or free sample. Furthermore, probabilities of adoption may depend on the
distribution of adopters at each point in time. Thus, the focus of our analysis is on the
volume of initial adopters (that endogenously generate transmission probabilities). Third,
using techniques derived from Jackson and Rogers (2004) based on stochastic dominance
arguments, we are able to make comparisons across general network structures, whereas the
previous literature has had to resort either to simulations or specic degree distributions in
order to make comparisons.
In the economics literature, Young (2000) approaches a similar set of questions to ours
with a dierent modeling setup. In Young's analysis, neighbors' eects on an agent's utility
are separable. Young studies a process reminiscent of the one used here in which at each
point in time, agents update with a logistic distribution that is a function of payo dierences
arising from the dierent actions played against current play (rather than a simple best
response). Young's main result shows that for suÆciently dense networks, there is an upper
bound on the time span it takes the entire population to switch actions with arbitrarily high
probability. There is also a literature that examines the equilibrium outcomes of a variety of
games played on networks (e.g., Chwe (2000), Morris (2000) and Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson,
Vega, and Yariv (2005)). Those analyses have a dierent structure as to how neighbors'
2
A classical example is that of AIDS, in which one person, \patient O", has been identied as the trigger
to the spread of the disease in the westernized world - see Auerbach, Darrow, Jae, and Curran (1984).
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actions matter. In addition, they focus on the overall equilibrium structure rather than the
tipping point and diusion of behavior that we analyze here.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the description of the model and
the results. We rst present results characterizing the diusion dynamics. We then present
some comparative statics of the analyzed dynamics. Section 3 concludes.
2 Diusion Dynamics and \Tipping"
2.1 The Model
We consider a society of individuals who each start out taking an action A. The possibility
arises of switching to a new action B (a metaphor for a new technology, for example).
We consider a countable set of agents and capture the social structure by its underlying
network. The way in which we model the network is through the distribution of the number
of direct neighbors, or degree, that each agent has. Agent i's degree is denoted d
i
: The
fraction of agents in the population with d neighbors is given by P (d) > 0; for d = 1; ::::; D;
and
X
D
d=1
P (d) = 1:
Behavior A is the default behavior (for example, the status-quo technology) and its payo
to an agent is normalized to 0. An agent i has a cost of choosing B, denoted c
i
> 0. An
agent also has some benet from B, denoted v
i
 0. These are randomly and independently
distributed across the society, according to a distribution that we specify shortly. Agent i's
payo from adopting behavior B when i has d
i
neighbors is:
v
i
g(d
i
)
i
  c
i
where and 
i
is the fraction of i's neighbors who have chosen B and g(d
i
) is a function
capturing how the number of neighbors that i has aects the benets to i from adopting B.
So, i will switch to B if the corresponding cost-benet analysis is favorable, that is, if
v
i
c
i
g(d
i
)
i
 1: (1)
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Thus, the primitives of the model are the distribution of d
i
's in the population (P ), the
specication of g, and the distribution of v
i
=c
i
. Let F be the cumulative distribution function
of v
i
=c
i
. For ease of exposition we assume that F is twice dierentiable and has a density f:
To get some feeling for behavior as a function of the number of neighbors that an agent
has, let us examine a case where g(d) = d

. If  > 0, then agents with higher degrees
(i.e., more neighbors) are more likely to adopt the new technology or behavior for any given
fraction of neighbors who have adopted 
i
, while if  < 0, then agents with higher degrees
are less likely to adopt the new technology or behavior. The case where  > 0 is one where
benets depend not only on the fraction, but also on the number of an agent's neighbors
who have adopted the behavior. For instance, if  = 1, then g(d
i
)
i
is simply proportional
to the number of neighbors that an agent has who have adopted the behavior (which is a
standard case in the epidemiology literature, where infection rates are proportional to the
number of contacts with infected individuals). If  = 0, then an agent cares only about
the fraction of neighbors who have adopted the action B and not on their absolute number
(which is a standard case studied in coordination games, where players are often thought of
to be randomly matched with a neighbor to play a game). In that case, an agent's degree
plays less of a role than in cases where  6= 0.
At t = 0; a fraction x
0
of the population is exogenously and randomly switched to the
action B. At each stage t > 0; each agent, including the fraction of x
0
agents who are
assigned the action B at the outset, best responds to the distribution of agents choosing the
action B in period t  1:
As we shall show below, convergence of behavior from the starting point is monotone,
either upwards or downwards. So, once an agent (voluntarily) switches behaviors, the agent
will not want to switch back at a later date. Thus, although these best responses are
myopic, any changes in behavior are equivalently forward-looking. The eventual rest point
of the system is an equilibrium of the system.
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2.2 Diusion
Let x
t
d
denote the fraction of those agents with degree d who have adopted the behavior B
by time t, and let x
t
denote the link-weighted fraction of agents who have adopted by time
t. That is,
x
t
=
X
d
x
t
d
dP (d)

d
;
where

d is the average degree under P . The reason for weighting by links is standard:
dP (d)

d
is
the probability that any given neighbor of some agent is of degree d (under the presumption
that there is no correlation in degrees of linked agents).
We analyze a simple dynamic that leads to an overall equilibrium of the system. We
begin with some random perturbation where x
0
d
of the agents of degree d have adopted.
Given this, we then check each agent's best response to the system. This leads to a new x
1
d
for each d. Iterating on this process, we show that the system will eventually converge to a
steady state. The convergence point is an equilibrium in the sense that given the state of
the system, no additional agents wish to adopt, and none of the agents who have adopted
would like to change their minds.
Given the complexity of the system, we use a standard technique for estimating the so-
lutions. Namely, we use a mean-eld analysis to estimate the proportion of the population
that will have adopted at each time. This is described as follows. We start with the as-
sumption that each i has the same initial fraction of neighbors adopting B, x
0
(and ignore
the constraint that this be an integer). We also ignore the random distribution of initial
adopters throughout the population. Each agent is matched with the actual distribution of
the population.
3
So, i will adopt B in the rst period if v
i
=c
i
> 1=(g(d)x
0
). Based on this, the fraction of
3
Another way to think about this approximation is as follows. Contemplate a two stage process such that
at the rst stage, each agent has a probability of x
0
of being assigned the new behavior B, and at the second
stage, each agent is randomly matched to neighbors according to P (d): The expected fraction of neighbors
of each individual choosing B is then x
0
; and our approximation assumes that agents place a probability of
1 on the mean.
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degree d types who will adopt B in the rst period is
x
1
d
= 1  F [1=(g(d)x
0
)]:
We now have a new probability that a given link points to an adopter, which is x
1
=
P
d
dP (d)x
1
d
=

d. Iterating on this, at time t we get x
t
d
= 1   F [1=(g(d)x
t 1
)]. This gives us
an equation:
x
t
=
1

d
X
d
dP (d)
 
1  F [1=(g(d)x
t 1
)]

;
or
x
t
= 1 
1

d
X
d
dP (d)F

1
g(d)x
t 1

: (2)
Let us note a few things about this system. The right hand side is non-decreasing in x
t 1
,
and when starting with x
t 1
= 0 the generated next period level of adoption is x
t
= 0 (noting
that F (1) = 1). Provided x
1
 x
0
, this system converges upwards to some point above x
0
.
Note that this happens even if we allow the initial adopters to only stay adopters if they
prefer to. Once we have gotten to x
1
, this includes exactly those who prefer to have adopted
given the initial shock of x
0
, and now the level is either above or below x
0
, depending on the
specics of the system.
So we can ask what minimal x
0
is needed in order to have the action B diuse throughout
the population; that is, to have x
t
converge to a point above the initial point. We call this
minimal x
0
the tipping point of the system:
4
We can then also ask what x
t
converges to.
In order to gain some insights regarding how the network structure (as captured through
P ) and how preferences vary with degree (as captured through g), we examine a case where
F is the uniform distribution on some interval [0; b].
In that case, (2) becomes
x
t
= 1 
X
d
dP (d)

d
min[1;
1
bg(d)x
t 1
]: (3)
4
In general, it is possible to have multiple convergence points depending on the initial seeding. Here
we look for the smallest seeding that will lead to some upwards convergence, and consequently analyze its
corresponding convergence point. In many cases, there will be a unique point that we could converge to
from below.
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In a case where x
t 1
is large enough so that bg(d)x
t 1
 1 for each d, then we can rewrite
this as
x
t 1
(1  x
t
) =
X
d
dP (d)
b

dg(d)
: (4)
Let  =
P
d
dP (d)
b

dg(d)
.
From (4) we deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that F is uniform on [0; b] and bg(d)(1 
p
1  4)=2  1 for all d.
 If x
0
< (1 
p
1  4)=2 then the system converges to x

= 0.
 If x
0
 (1 
p
1  4)=2 then the system converges (upwards) to x

= (1+
p
1  4)=2.
Proposition 1 tells us that (1  
p
1  4)=2 is the tipping point of the system, beyond
which there is convergence upwards. If the initial number of adopters is pushed above this
level, then the dynamics converge upwards to an eventual point of x

= (1+
p
1  4)=2. If
the threshold is not reached, then the system collapses back to 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the system by showing the dependence of x
t+1
on x
t
.
The gures are for a benet/cost distribution which is uniform on [0; 5] (F  U [0; 5]) and a
scale-free network with power 2:5: That is, P (d) / d
 2:5
for d 6 D = 1000:
5
The relationship
between x
t+1
and x
t
are drawn for g(d) = 1; g(d) = d; and g(d) = d
2
:
As is clearly seen, up to a certain x
t
; the resulting x
t+1
= 0. Beyond this point there is a
range where x
t+1
> 0, but still x
t
> x
t+1
. The tipping point is the rst point where x
t+1
= x
t
.
Above that point, we see that x
t+1
> x
t
, up to the second point where x
t+1
= x
t
. This second
point is where the system converges to if the initial tipping threshold is surpassed. If the
tipping point is not initially surpassed, then the system converges back to 0.
5
Scale-free networks have been claimed to approximate the degree distributions of some social networks,
ranging from the World Wide Web links to phone lines (see Newman (2003) for an overview), and have
been identied by a power parameter which falls in between 2 and 3. Jackson and Rogers (2004) provide
empirical ts illustrating the diversity of degree distributions that real-world social networks exhibit. In
particular, some networks previously claimed to be scale-free are, in fact, not so. Nevertheless, the scale-free
distributions are a class that has been extensively used in parts of the literature to model social networks
and are thus of some interest, and they do capture some features of observed networks.
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Figure 1:  Tipping Dynamics
When we look above the tipping point, we see that the population of those choosing
B increases, with increasing speed at rst, and then decreasing speed later on. For higher
values of g(d); the returns from a marginal increase in the probability of a neighbor choosing
the action B is higher and hence the tipping point is lower and the response to any xed
fraction of the population choosing B is higher in terms of the new fraction of agents choosing
B. These sorts of changes in the rate of convergence are characteristic of a wide variety of
settings, as we now show.
Let
G(x) =
1

d
X
d
dP (d) (1  F [1=(g(d)x)]) (5)
so that x
t+1
= G(x
t
): Note that if F (y) is a strictly increasing function then G(x) is strictly
increasing as well. In particular, if one starts with any x
0
such that G(x
0
) > x
0
, then the
resulting x
t
's will form an increasing sequence and converge upwards to some limit. The
shape of the dynamic process depends on the shape of the function G: As we show below, if
the initial threshold is passed, then the speed with which the fraction of B adopters increases
is increasing at rst, and decreasing after some threshold point in time.
Proposition 2 If F (y) is strictly increasing and yF (y) is a convex function of y, then there
exists T 2 f0; 1; : : : ;1g such that if 0  t < T; then
x
t
x
t 1
<
x
t+1
x
t
and if t > T; then
x
t
x
t 1
>
x
t+1
x
t
(where x
 1
= G
 1
(x
0
) provided x
0
> 0).
Proof of Proposition 2: Using (5), we write
x
t+1
= G(x
t
) and
x
t+1
x
t
=
G(x
t
)
x
t
:
Now,

G(x)
x

0
=
P
d
dP (d)
h
1
g(d)x
f

1
g(d)x

+ F

1
g(d)x

  1
i

dx
2
Notice that yf(y) + F (y) = (yF (y))
0
. If (yF (y))
00
> 0; then as x increases, the numerator
decreases. Suppose we start with suÆciently high x
0
so that x
1
> x
0
: In that case, x
t+1
> x
t
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for all t; and

G(x
t
)
x
t

0
decreases with time, either reaching 0 at which case T < 1; or not.
Alternatively, if x
0
is so low so that x
1
< x
0
then x
t+1
< x
t
for all t; and

G(x
t
)
x
t

0
increases
with time. If

G(x
0
)
x
0

0
> 0 then T = 0. If

G(x
0
)
x
0

0
< 0; then T > 0; (in fact, if

G(x
t
)
x
t

0
converges below 0 then T = 1). If x
1
= x
0
; then the steady state is achieved immediately
and T = 0:
2.3 Comparisons across Networks
We can also deduce how the tipping threshold and eventual adoption fraction change as the
network structure is varied. This is an important issue in many contexts. In marketing, the
tipping points for the initiations of fashions (in products, in the use of a new technology,
etc.) may dier across demographics if those are characterized by dierent social structures.
In epidemiology, the likelihood of the eruption of an epidemic may depend on the underlying
social network. These are but two of many possible examples.
The network shifts we consider are characterized by statistical shifts of the relevant degree
distributions. In particular, we consider shifts that raise the fraction of agents with many
neighbors (First Order Stochastic Dominance, or FOSD, shifts), and shifts that raise the
heterogeneity of connectedness in the population (Second Order Stochastic Dominance, or
SOSD, shifts).
Note that from Proposition 1 we see that any change that leads  =
P
d
dP (d)
b

dg(d)
to increase
will lead to a higher threshold and lower eventual convergence point. A decrease in  will
do the reverse. Since shifts in the degree distribution P aect  in very particular ways, we
can deduce the implications of a variety of network shifts.
The rst proposition addresses rst order stochastic dominance shifts in the degree dis-
tribution.
Proposition 3 Suppose that F is uniform on [0; b], that bg(d)(1 
p
1  4)=2  1 for all
d, and that P rst order stochastically dominates P
0
.
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(1) If d=g(d) is a decreasing function of d, then the tipping point is lower and the upper
convergence point is higher under P .
(2) If d=g(d) is an increasing function of d, then the tipping point is higher and the upper
convergence point is lower under P .
(3) If d=g(d) is constant, then the tipping point and the upper convergence point under P
are the same as under P
0
.
Proposition 3 follows directly from noting that the change in  due to a rst order
stochastic dominance shift in the distribution depends on whether d=g(d) is an increasing or
decreasing function of d.
6
Proposition 3 tells us something about how adding links to the network changes the
convergence behavior. In cases where d=g(d) is a decreasing function of d we see that this
leads to lower thresholds and higher convergence points. This situation corresponds to
situations where g(d) increases in d more rapidly than d. Thus, larger degree nodes become
more sensitive to neighbors adopting the behavior. In such a situation, increasing average
degree (in the sense of FOSD) increases overall sensitivity of the population to the behavior
of others, leading to lower thresholds and higher convergence. The reverse is true if d=g(d)
is decreasing.
Addressing SOSD shifts, we use a similar logic to deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that F is uniform on [0; b] and suppose that bg(d)(1 
p
1  4)=2 
1 for all d. Consider P that second order stochastically dominates P
0
.
(1) If d=g(d) is strictly concave, then the tipping point is lower and the upper convergence
point is higher under P
0
.
(2) If d=g(d) is strictly convex, then the tipping point is higher and the upper convergence
point is lower under P
0
.
6
First order stochastic dominance of P over P
0
is equivalent to having the expectation of all increasing
functions be larger under P than under P
0
(and decreasing functions be smaller).
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(3) If g(d) is either linear or constant, then the tipping point and the upper convergence
point are the same.
Again, the proof is achieved directly from examining the changes in  due to the SOSD
shift in distributions.
7
This proposition provides a look at how changing the spread in degrees throughout the
population changes the behavior of diusion.
To illustrate the conditions in Propositions 3 and 4, consider g(d) = d

, where   0.
In that case, d=g(d) = d
1 
=. This is concave and increasing if 0 <  < 1 and is convex
and decreasing if  > 1. Note that g(d) is constant if  = 0 and d=g(d) is constant if  = 1.
3 Conclusions
We introduced a simple model of behavioral shifts in the presence of network externalities
and network structure. There are three main insights that come out of the paper. First,
the dynamics are characterized by a threshold level of initial adopters: a tipping point. If
that point is surpassed, then there is an increase in the eventual number of adopters of the
behavior. If the initial number of adopters falls below this threshold, then the behavior will
eventually die out. Second, if the tipping point is surpassed, then the diusion dynamics are
characterized by increasing speeds of adoption initially and slower speeds of adoption later
on. Third, under some assumptions on the primitives of the model, we can describe how the
tipping point and eventual convergence point depend on the network structure. First order
and second order stochastic dominance shifts in the degree distributions aect the tipping
point as well as the convergence point in ways that depend on the returns to each agent from
a xed fraction of her neighbors choosing to adopt the action in question.
7
If P second order stochastically dominates P
0
, then it leads to larger expectations of all strictly concave
functions, and smaller expectations of strictly convex functions.
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